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ABSTRACT
Red-collar crime is an understudied phenomenon that occurs when white-collar crime turns into
physical violence and/or death (also known as fraud-detection homicide). Frank S. Perri, coined
the term red-collar crime following his study of 27 homicides that occurred at the same time as or
before the deadly white-collar criminal occurrences. This study explores the generalizability and

practicality of this definition as applied to a new set of cases. Using a case study analysis of six
cases this study analyzed the behavioral characteristics of these offenders meeting Perri's
definition; Characteristics such as entitlement, lack of empathy, power orientation,
rationalizations, exploitations, and a general disregard for rules and social norms were all found
in this sample in alignment with Perri’s theorized matrix. This study affirms the similarity of redcollar offender behavior to street-level criminals suggested by Perri. Practical considerations and
suggestions for future research are provided.
Keywords: fraud, embezzlement, insurance fraud, corporate fraud, extortion, credit
card/automated teller machine fraud, blackmail/extortion, impersonation, welfare fraud, and false
pretenses/swindle/confidence game
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INTRODUCTION
Many scholars brought attention to the crimes of the powerful (Bonger, 1916; DuBois, 1967;
Ross, 1907; Van Erp, 2018), but Edwin Sutherland was the first to distinguish ‘white-collar’
criminals. In 1939, Sutherland conceptualized and defined white-collar crime while comparing
the upper and lower classes of society; he observed that high-society, respected businesspeople
were committing specific types of crimes (Sutherland, 1939). Sutherland later revised his
definition of white-collar crime to the now-familiar term, that of high-status people with great
power in their profession who commit fraud (Sutherland, 1949). Unlike street-level offenders,
white-collar criminals were once thought to be one-time offenders, but even these perpetrators
showed a high tendency toward rule-breaking behaviors (Benson and Kerley, 2001; Weisburd
and Waring, 2001). Current research suggests that the traditional stereotype of white-collar
criminals as single offense offenders may need an adjustment (van Onna, van der Geest, &
Denkers, 2020).
Society often fails to grasp what white-collar crime is because the field is rife with
misconceptions. The literature reviewed in this study will attempt to address these common
misconceptions and their potential consequences, as well as provide a brief overview of the
history and current definitions of white-collar crime. Current research shows that white-collar
criminals exhibit similar violent aggressive behaviors to non-white-collar criminals (Alalheto
and Azarian, 2018). Behavioral traits are important risk factors for street-level forms of crime;
the potential application to white-collar crime makes logical sense (Listwan, Piquero & Van
Voorhis, 2010).

5

In further research on white-collar crime, subcategories of the subject came to the surface.
Take, for example, the phenomenon of red-collar crime. Frank S. Perri was the prosecutor in the
2004 homicide trial People of the State of Illinois v. George Hansen. In this case, the defendant
killed his business partner to avoid detection of a fraud scandal (Hansen, 2004). The disclosure
of the motive for this case piqued Perri's interest in white-collar crime. He wondered if these
white-collar criminals constituted a new subgroup of criminals. He collected homicide cases with
similar motivations. He searched legal documents, such as murder trials disclosed in newspapers,
and public court sentences in which white-collar criminals were convicted of homicide or
attempted homicide. Perri discovered that academic research has few studies on white-collar
criminals with respect to their motives and behavioral patterns. Continuing, Perri also discovered
that violent white-collar criminals, not being strange anomalies, harbor behavioral risk factors.
These factors promote their use of violence as a solution to their problem. This issue is no
different from non-white-collar offenders that resort to violence, even if they have different
motives (Perri, 2015). Owing to his involvement in the 2004 Hansen case and research
discoveries in 2005, Perri described white-collar criminals who turned violent as ‘red-collar’.
Red-collar and white-collar criminals should not be confused as being the same type of
criminal. White-collar criminals have a mixed history of white-collar and non-white-collar
crimes that may include violent histories. The motive behind the violence determines the
criminal subgroup as red-collar. Offenders engage in violence to silence those that threaten
detection or disclosure of their fraudulent schemes. 'Fraud detection, homicide' also classifies
this type of homicide as well. Several written judicial opinions and case facts from investigation
and prosecution disclosures provide evidence of the planned nature of this crime. A review of
these case facts supports several conclusions as to the underlying motive (Perri, 2015). There are
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no longitudinal studies on the number of committed red-collar crimes. Past studies focused on
descriptive statistics such as age, gender, race, frauds preceding the homicide, victimology, and
behavioral make-up, to name a few. Perri believes it is advantageous to begin the conversation
about red-collar crime, as his own study offers a template to refine and clarify the criminal
profile (Perri, 2015).

RED-COLLAR CRIME
Current research on red-collar crime shows that these offenders are willing participants in
acts of violence. This violence may manifest in the use of firearms, controlled substances,
manual strangulation, and blunt force trauma. These criminals have also proven willing to sign
for murder-for-hire cases on their behalf (Perri, 2019). Red-collar crime is a newly defined
subgroup of white-collar crime. I want to explore any gaps that may exist in the literature. To do
so, I will describe what white-collar crime is now, and any misconceptions that may still exist.
Doing this will investigate the reasons why red-collar criminals are willing to commit acts of
violence. Describing white-collar criminal behavioral characteristics will shed light on that of a
red-collar criminal as well.

WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND ITS MISCONCEPTIONS
Sutherland believed that white-collar crime is a crime committed by the upper echelons
of society. These people usually have a big influence on their business. (1949). Today, scholars
define white-collar crime as crimes committed by financial elites who abuse the trust and power
that have been given to them in their careers (Benson and Simpson 2015; Dearden 2017; Piquero
2012). What the phenomenon of white-collar crime is and how to measure it is still widely
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discussed by scholars. However, much of Sutherland's original stances (1934, 1940, 1949, 1973,
1983) are still found to be true now (Simpson, 2019).
As I engage in the use of current knowledge of white-collar crime, I will look at
Sutherland's findings from a retrospective lens. Because his influence on white-collar crime is so
wide-ranging, a lot of misunderstandings can arise. White-collar crime reflects high levels of
corporate misconduct and occupational fraud schemes among middle-class citizens (Weisburd et
al., 1991). This combined with predatory offenses (Bucy et al., 2008) are keys to Sutherland's
perception of this white-collar offender. It is important to stress that some aspects of his work
have stood the test of time; take, for example, his use of a life history approach (Simpson, 2019;
Friedrichs, Schultz, and Jordanoska, 2018). The life history approach examines how one’s
personal history effects their future decisions and behaviors; this is the approach he used when
he studied corporate criminals (Laub, & Sampson, R. J. 2019). However, current research has
shown that Sutherland’s research has been shortsighted on important developments that he could
not have foreseen, such as motivations (Simpson, 2019). One of Sutherland’s most important
criticisms can be found in his analysis of crime data. To him, the crime data did not capture
crimes committed by businesses. This issue creates a bias in the data (1949). This bias may lead
to a general misunderstanding of the topic due to bridge gaps in such data and current findings in
the field.
Society perceives illegal behavior to be out of character for white-collar criminals
because we view them as employed, educated, and law-abiding citizens. These criminals may
also present positive ethical behaviors in areas of their lives, and thus are less likely to be
categorized as having criminal behaviors despite the severity and consequences of their crimes
(Brody, Melendy, & Perri, 2012). Scholars and behavioral science experts did not apply criminal
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thinking traits to white-collar offenders in the past, unlike non-white-collar offenders, so this
misconception continued for decades. Efforts were focused on examining index crimes such as
property, narcotics-related crimes, violence, and theft (Lilly, Cullen, & Ball, 2011). Scholars also
drove their focus toward the social processes within an organization that might serve as "risk
factors for fraud to flourish" (Sutherland, 1949, p. 19). In doing so, they rejected individual
personality traits as potential fraud offender risk factors (Perri, Lichtenwald, &; Mieczkowska,
2014). White-collar and non-white-collar offenders display persistent criminal thought patterns
and attitudes about circumstances to exploit (Samenow, 1984).
It is important to understand the criminal thinking of white-collar crime, however, this
requires debunking the myth that these types of offenders do not represent similar criminal
groups. White-collar criminal histories and levels of deviance are no different from non-whitecollar criminals (Walters, & Geyer, 2004). Not many white-collar studies have been conducted
to discuss behavioral consistencies following their careers over a long period of time (van Onna,
et al., 2020). These life-course studies show that only a few cases have consistent criminal
behavior. Most of these white-collar offenders are categorized by low-frequency offending
(Benson and Kerley, 2001; Van Onna, van der Geest, & Denkers., 2014; Weisburd and Waring,
2001). A lack of understanding of this type of criminal thinking may help the criminal
community. It may block specific searches for criminal activity that can be used to define redcollar trends (Perri, 2015).
In investigating these current white-collar trends, I will consider the evolution of whitecollar crime. The reasons and motivations behind the white-collar crime are an enduring
criminological conundrum (Jordanoska, 2018). Understanding the social psychology of one's
fraudulent behavior is grounded on, but not limited to how an individual reacts to the instability
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of preferences, (Maulidi, 2020). Like street criminals, white-collar criminals are motivated by
need, greed, fear of failure, revenge, excitement, and economic survival (Jordanoska, 2018).
Abundant criminal motives can more successfully deepen our understanding of white-collar
crime than linear motives such as self-control (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1987) or culture of
competition found exclusively in white-collar crime (Coleman, 1987). This data is important to
collect to understand these motives.
To improve our reach in data, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) promptly
supplies data on white-collar crime in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR); tracking any
statistical data can help to identify the baseline to the criminal profile. The UCR provided by the
FBI, documents only a small number of white-collar crimes. There is not a current national
database provided by the U.S. Department of Justice for white-collar crime statistics. There is
also a lack of a central repository that reports an annual collection, tracking, and reporting of
white-collar crime statistics that cover a wide variety of white-collar offenders and their offenses
(McGurrin, et al., 2003). Incident-based statistics are collected by The National Incident-Based
Reporting System (NIBRS). A restricted record of white-collar criminal arrest accounts of
bribery, embezzlement, forgery, and fraud—offenses represented at the individual level. (Barnett
2000). The FBI examined challenges with these offenses. They specifically noted that both
NIBRS and UCR had been developed with the state and crime data interests in mind. The FBI
did not keep the interests of researchers in mind because white-collar offenses typically fall
under the jurisdiction of federal agencies. Many white-collar crime categories are not included
(McGurrin, et al., 2003). The lack of regard for white-collar criminal thinking supports the
assumption that these offenders may use this vulnerability to expose and target victims. These
crimes may be perpetrated by the same people believed to not have the capacity to resort to
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violence and criminal actions. Behavioral risk patterns and personality traits must be studied so
that we may further our understanding of white-collar criminals.

OFFENDER BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS AND ATTITUDES
Forensic criminal psychologist Dr. Stanton Samenow warns academics/readers against
the idea that crime is out of character for an offender because of their lack of criminal history or
societal offenses. He warns against using the ideas such as a strong employment record and the
appearance of being an upstanding member of society as a basis of character (Samenow, 2010).
Life-course studies on the white-collar offenders have revealed that once criminally active, these
offenders show less crime specialization than previously thought (Benson and Moore, 1992; Van
Onna et al., 2014). Self-reporting studies have indicated that misconduct levels, both inside and
outside of the workplace, may be higher than their criminal records show (Menard, Morris,
Gerber, & Covey., 2011; Morris and El Sayed, 2013). This premise holds true to both white and
non-white-collar offenses (Perri, 2013). Historically, it was believed that white-collar criminals’
illegal actions are out of character. However, years of research conducted by Samenow,
described that there has yet to be an observable case where the person is acting out of character.
His research also points out that there is a persistent lack of complete information surrounding
aspects of a criminal’s behavior period. For example, behavior such as deviant thought processes
may predate their offenses and have existed for a long time. The offenders may have been
repressing these unnerving thoughts in wait for an opportunity to present itself (Samenow, 2010).
The fact that the offender has chosen to engage in certain acts does not mean that it is
outside of one’s character. It also does not mean that those anti-social traits cannot be revealed
through their actions (Perri et al., 2014). These people use a cost-benefit analysis or risk
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assessment to sort through their actions. This response is the stage where they decide if
committing the crime is worth the costs (Shover & Wright, 2001). People at all socio-economic
levels have the potential to display criminal anti-social attitudes. Many scholars have begun to
apply criminal thinking attributes to white-collar criminals, but Sutherland is the first (Gaylord,
& Galliher, 2020). Criminal thinking is defined as a concentrated or distorted thought pattern that
involves values and attitudes that support criminal actions and lifestyles (Walters, 2020). These
thoughts justify and rationalize law-breaking behaviors. (Taxman, Rhodes, & Dumenci, 2011).
Criminal thinking was a stressed role in the support, maintenance, and reinforcement of adult
criminal behavior (Walters, 1990). Commonly displayed criminal traits often include but are not
limited to, entitlement, lack of empathy, power orientation, rationalizations, exploitations, and a
general disregard for rules and norms (Walters, 1995). Not only limited to one group, but
criminal thinking and anti-social traits also apply to both white and red-collar offenders (Walters,
2002; Walters & Geyer, 2004; Perri & Lichtenwald, 2007). Those who commit white-collar
criminal acts are often just as likely to be repeat offenders as non-white-collar offenders
(Weisburd, Warring, & Chaye, 2001).
Studies have shown that recidivism rates are comparable between white-collar and nonwhite-collar crime (Weissmann & Block, 2007), both types of offenders possess thinking and
criminal deviancy traits that are virtually identical to one another, especially among chronic reoffenders (Walters & Geyer, 2004). White-collar criminals become more comparable to streetlevel criminals when there is an observable pattern of fraudulent activities. This new comparison
puts them into the category of being viewed as predators or pathological criminals. (Dorminey et
al., 2010).
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RED-COLLAR BEHAVIORAL RISKS
In his research, Perri highlighted the personality traits of red-collar criminals. These traits
point out the increased risk of committing crimes such as embezzlement, tax evasion, or fraud in
the white-collar community. He pointed to psychopathic and narcissistic traits, which he claimed
were key to the rise of white-collar crime turning red (Alalheto, & Azarian, 2018). These
characteristics will be particularly focused on for this study as well.
Psychopaths are characterized by their self-centeredness. They possess attitudes of
manipulation, deception, and exploitation, and their means always justify the ends, regardless of
the crime (Ray, 2007). They minimize the harmful consequences of their actions, neutralize their
wrongdoings with superficial justifications, and tend to blame their victims for their actions
towards them. Psychopaths possess the ability to lie without feeling uncomfortable, and they can
manipulate people with high-quality interpersonal skills. This quality allows them to easily
persuade their victims (Boddy, 2006; Hare, 1993; Ray, 2007).
Narcissism is a personality disorder that involves a strong sense of self-confidence; it is
exaggerated by the overt feeling of excessive admiration, self-importance, and a lack of empathy
for others. Narcissistic people have an exaggerated conception of their abilities and potential.
They believe that they are superior and unique, which drives their need for gratification for their
achievements. These people value themselves over others to the extent that disregards the wishes
and feelings of others (Alalheto, & Azarian, 2018). They tend to be exploitative of people's
personal gains and achievements, fostering their interpersonal relationships in a manipulative and
excessively instrumental fashion. Their extreme sense of entitlement impels them to believe they
have special privileges over ordinary people (Perri, 2011). White-collar criminals may possess
these qualities and knowing this may provide clarity to the red-collar criminal profile.
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The misconceptions that surround the white-collar profile are starting to be corrected.
Research is beginning to define this offender group in a way that is not based on opinion (Perri,
2015). It has become increasingly clear that the white-collar offenders choose different
aggressors to satiate their daunting motives, which at times can and do involve using forms of
violence to solve their problems. Research suggests that any personality and behavioral traits
should no longer be ignored because they may be subject to possibly murderous white-collar
behavior lurking below the surface (Ragatz, Fremouw, & Baker, 2012). Important violation
pattern factors in observations can easily be overlooked, which can quickly become problematic.
Evidence explains that there is a significant relationship between an anti-social disposition and
the underlying confirmation of narcissism and psychopathy. When combined with a criminal
mindset, this event creates a negative relationship. This response then increases the risk of whitecollar criminal behavior (Perri & Brody, 2012).

INSTRUMENTAL AND REACTIVE VIOLENCE
Next, I compared accusations of instrumental violence and accusations of reactive
violence. When the offense is goal-oriented first, the homicide will be rated under the use of
instrumental violence. There may be no evidence of direct situational or emotional provocation.
Instrumental violence has a means to an end, this eventuality is violence served directly by
motive (Hart & Dempster, 1997). This evidence of a gap in time between the frustration or
provocation, (also known as a cooling-off period) and the murder, classifies the homicide as
using instrumental violence (Woodworth & Porter, 2002). For a homicide to be rated as reactive
violence, there must be irrefutable evidence that the crime was committed at a high level of
spontaneity and lacked planning or premeditation. This eventuality is considered a rapid reaction
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before the act of murder with no specific goal other than to immediately harm the provocation
(Perri, 2015). Reactive violence often occurs between family members and acquaintances, as
opposed to instrumental violence where it often occurs between strangers.

GENDER AND RED-COLLAR CRIME
Restricting work to men in the past has left a huge gap in understanding how women may
think differently of offending parties. Research suggests that women are unlikely to take part in
any large white-collar schemes. They tend to participate in more subordinate roles (Benson &
Gottschalk, 2015) Steffensmeier, Schwartz, & Roche, 2013). Feminine gender norms to inherent
concern for others may explain displacing responsibility for these types of offenses.
A study comparing men and women in criminal thinking suggested a general similarity
between the two genders. However, evidence showed that women scored slightly higher than
men on individually scored components. This similarity in thinking styles is striking given the
offense distribution is uneven across white-collar crimes. Take, for example, embezzlement. It is
nearly twice as likely to be committed by young females compared to men (Galvin, 2020). This
suggests that, despite gender norms, there is little difference in the cognitive process between
male and female offenders that are charged with white-collar offenses, however, women remain
less involved in criminal activity, and this includes white-collar offenses (Belknap, 2001).
Women, too, exhibit antisocial behaviors (Dolan & Vollm, 2009) along with varied personality
disorders (Warren & South, 2006).
This issue suggests that criminal thinking in red-collar cases may present the same risk
factors across genders (Perri & Lichtenwald, 2010). For example, psychopathy is displayed by
both genders (Cleckley, 1976). However, research has typically been conducted under the male
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assumption, rather than including female studies (Skeem et al., 2011). There are several clinical
accounts of female psychopaths. While admittedly there is very little empirical research on
female psychopathy (Carozza, 2008), stereotypes and rigid sex roles in society and the diagnosis
of personality disorders are to a large extent influenced by sex-role expectations. This idea may
be the reason for neglect in the research (Widom, 1978; Brown, 1996). Males and females who
display psychopathic tendencies share similar affective and interpersonal features, this issue can
include egocentricity, deceptiveness, shallow emotions, and lack of empathy (Carozza, 2008).

INSTRUMENTATION
This study uses Frank S. Perri’s Red-Collar Matrix (RCM) to conduct a case study
analysis. Several pattern characteristics are on the Perri-RCM that are used to examine the new
cases. “The Perri-RCM was developed to distinguish behavioral inferences from other evidence
gathered during both the investigation and subsequent trials. Clearly, the pattern characteristics
in the Perri-RCM are not all-inclusive, and as more cases are analyzed, the Perri-RCM can be
modified to accommodate additional characteristics that may be useful for profiling” (Perri &
Lichtenwald, 2007, p. 20). Every case where the defendant had been involved in fraud will be
listed under the last name which will appear at the top of the matrix. An example of the matrix
will be provided in the appendices, showing the original Perri-RCM.
Red-collar criminals share similar psychopathic tendencies as non-violent white-collar
offenders. The biggest difference between the two criminals is the factors in the red-collar
criminal's character that allow them to see violence as a viable solution (Belmore & Quinsey,
1994). Many white-collar psychopaths have antisocial traits. However, this fact is different from
violent traits, which are found in red-collar criminals. Men and women possess the ability to
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demonstrate these traits (Perri, & Lichtenwald, 2007). The phenomenon of white-collar crime
turning red is an idea that should be recognized by scholars. Understanding the evolution from
one to the other may help to prevent violent crimes by being able to recognize these
characteristics in fraud accounts before it reaches the point of violence.
Matrices like the one Perri Used for his profiling tool are used in social sciences explore
relationships between individuals and populations. Relationships are not this simple, but matrices
allow one focus on specific characteristics. (Bradley & Meek, 2014). The use of the Perri-RCM
in this case maps out the relationship between behavioral pattern characteristics and the people
that are being assessed.

METHODOLOGY
Perri's research and introduction to red-collar crime are what inspired this study. This
thesis will be a qualitative case study analysis to determine whether different cases can satisfy
his description of red-collar by satisfying the same definitions and behavioral characteristics he
described in the original case study. A sample of homicides in the United States provided 100
cases for analysis. I searched each case using key terms (fraud, embezzlement, insurance fraud,
corporate fraud, Ponzi schemes, racketeering, and bankruptcy) to determine if they qualified as
white-collar crimes. If any of these terms appeared on the docket, the behavioral characteristics
and motivations were further analyzed to determine whether they fit the definition of a red-collar
crime. An analysis of these cases is used to understand whether the concept coined by Perri is
applicable to other cases.
6 of the 100 cases involved the key terms listed above. These cases are the focus of the
case analysis. The knowledge found from this study is important because it sheds new light on
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the current red-collar criminal research. Perri claims that this group of criminals is not
anomalous. However, my findings suggest that they only represent a small number of homicidal
offenders. I only found that 6% of the offenders in this sample included white-collar
terminology. After further analysis, only 4% of the cases met the definitions of a red-collar
crime. The use of Murderpedia as a source for offenders limited this study because it is a
crowdsourced encyclopedia. Crowdsourced means that the information posted from this source is
not checked for accuracy. However, this source creates access to a list of perpetrators that could
be randomized. Knowing this limitation, I collected all case facts from public records, court
cases, police records, and news releases outside of the encyclopedia. I want to better understand
what motivates a white-collar criminal to turn violent. Red-collar crime is by far the best
description I have come across, and I wanted to explore the concept further.
To continue research in the field of red-collar crime, I propose this qualitative study. A
sample of 100 homicide cases derived from Murderpedia is analyzed for the presence of whitecollar terminology. 6 out of 100 cases met the necessary white-collar definition. These cases are
the focus of this qualitative review and are analyzed against the behavioral pattern characteristics
in Perri's original Red-Collar Matrix. The perpetrator's motives were disclosed under the further
analysis of each case. As mentioned earlier, motive plays an important role in the definition of a
red-collar crime. Next, I analyzed each case to determine the point in time when the fraud
occurred. To meet the definition of a red-collar, the fraud must be committed before or at the
time of the homicide. Succeeding this round of analysis, it was discovered that only four of the
six focused studies met all requirements of red-collar crime. This study will explore whether his
description of red-collar crime applies to a new set of cases. I am interested in whether his
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definitions will apply to these and what percent of red-collar crimes exist among different types
of homicides.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
•
•

Is this definition of red-collar crime practical and generalizable when applied to a new set
of cases?
Does this study affirm similarities of red-collar offender behavior to street-level criminals
as suggested by Perri?
o What are these similarities?

DATA
Data Sources by Case
Amy DeChant:
•

Court Cases: DeChant v. State of Nevada

•

News Sources: The Naked & The Dead: Killer Amy DeChant Found in Nudist Camp,
New York Daily News; Woman Gets 25 Years for Killing of Live-in Boyfriend, The Las
Vegas Review; Fugitive Suspect in Weinstein Murder Arrest, Las Vegas Sun

Edward Wayne Edwards:
•

News Articles: Elderly Conman Confesses He Killed 4 During Career as Motivational
Speaker, ABC News; Serial killer Edward Wayne Edwards sentenced to death in Geauga
County slaying. Cleveland Plain Dealer

•

Books: IT'S ME: Edward Wayne Edwards, the Serial Killer You Never, Heard Of;
Metamorphosis of a criminal.

•

Police Records: FBI’s Most Wanted

Gary W. Ploof:
•

Court Cases: Ploof v. State
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•

News Articles: Life, while awaiting death, for convicted killer Ploof, Bay to Bay News;
Court Affirms Death Sentence for Wife Killer, Courthouse News Service

Linda Lou Charbonneau:
•

Court Cases: Charbonneau v. State of Delaware

•

News Articles: Three arrested for Delaware murders, The Rutland Herald; Charbonneau
Sentenced to Death. The Sussex Bureau Reporter.

•

Public Records: Delaware Public Records: Linda Lou Charbonneau

Louise Vermilyea:
•

News Articles: MRS. VERMILYA TRIES TO POISON HERSELF; Widow Accused of
Killing Policeman, and Suspected of Poisoning Eight Others, Near Death, The New York
Times; Barrington angry over poisoner case: Mrs. Louise Vermilya, Lake County
Independent and Waukegan Weekly Sun; POISON IN PEPPER CAN, The Herald
Democrat; Louise Vermilya, Chicago Tribune

Reverend John David Terry:
•

Court Cases: John David Terry v. State of Tennessee

•

News Articles: Pastor Charged with Murder in Headless Body Case, AP News; Minister
Sentenced to Death - The New York Times

SAMPLE
To explore Perri's definition of red-collar crime, a set of new cases was created. I used
Murderpedia, an online crowdsourced encyclopedia that organizes murderers by state. The tool is
a crowdsourced encyclopedia, so it is only used to provide the names of criminals in the United
States. A random selection of 10 states was selected from Murderpedia using a United States
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random state generator: Nevada, Tennessee, Louisiana, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Illinois, Indiana,
Wyoming, Delaware, and Ohio. Murderpedia also separates its offender list by the binary
gender, male and female. Both lists of offenders were assigned individual numbers. Using a
random number generator, 10 male and 10 female offenders were selected, creating a list of 20
offenders from each state. After using a random number generator again, 10 numbers were
selected from the new list of 20. This process was repeated for each state, finally giving a sample
of 100 homicide cases. Once the final list of murderers was collected, all cases were analyzed for
the use of key terms involving white-collar crime (Fraud, False Pretenses/Swindle/Confidence
Game, Corporate Fraud, Embezzlement, Credit Card/Automated Teller Machine Fraud,
Extortion/Blackmail, Welfare Fraud, Impersonation, Wire Fraud). The details from each case
were derived from public records, police reports, and case notes. Succeeding preliminary
analysis, 6 out of the 100 cases were found to contain aspects of white-collar crime. Following
with another round of analysis that focused on the discovery of red-collar behavioral
characteristics from Perri’s RCM, only 4 out of the 100 cases met the criteria of red-collar
definitions.

RED-COLLAR MATRIX
This study explores the red-collar phenomenon. Second, it seeks to determine if Perri's
descriptions of these types of criminals are when using a new sample uses Frank S. Perri’s RedCollar Matrix (RCM) to conduct a case study analysis. Several pattern characteristics are on the
Perri-RCM that are used to examine the new cases. The RCM was created to distinguish
behavioral characteristics from evidence gathered during the investigation and subsequent trials.
He acknowledges that the pattern characteristics in the matrix are not all-inclusive. This matrix
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can be modified to accommodate additional characteristics that may become prevalent to this
criminal profile (Perri & Lichtenwald, 2007) Every case where the defendant is involved in fraud
will be listed under their name which will appear at the top of the matrix. An example of Perri's
original matrix is provided in the appendices. A new matrix using the same pattern
characteristics as Perri's RCM and the new names of the current cases will be used to collect
data.

PROCEDURES
Each of the 100 cases went through the random selection process as earlier described,
deriving from a population set forth by Murderpedia. Knowing the limit set by using a
crowdsourced tool, only public records, news articles, and case files are used as data sources to
fill in the matrix. Each case is initially analyzed for any white-collar definitions provided by the
FBI (Fraud, False Pretenses/Swindle/Confidence Game, Corporate Fraud, Embezzlement, Credit
Card/Automated Teller Machine Fraud, Extortion/Blackmail, Welfare Fraud, Impersonation,
Wire Fraud). After separating potential white-collar cases from the rest, these cases are further
searched for Perri's defined red-collar behavioral patterns. For the case to be considered redcollar, fraud must predate or occur at the same time as the homicide. In some respects, the
suggestion that the red-collar criminal is willing to risk exposure to maintain anonymity appears
contradictory. Yet, the inclination to physical violence as a solution distinguishes these fraudsters
from non-violent white-collar criminals.
Specific terms are used to search through and identify the sample from the Murderpedia
population to ensure they fit the criteria of the definition set forth by Frank S. Perri of red-Collar
crime. The terms and their definitions provided by the FBI are as follows (FBI, 2012):
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•

Fraud: “The intentional perversion of the truth for the purpose of inducing another
person or other entity in reliance upon it to part with something of value or to
surrender a legal right. Fraudulent conversion and obtaining of money or property by
false pretenses. Confidence games and bad checks, except forgeries and
counterfeiting, are included.”

•

False Pretenses/Swindle/Confidence Game: “The intentional misrepresentation of
existing fact or condition, or the use of some other deceptive scheme or device, to
obtain money, goods, or other things of value”

•

Corporate Fraud: “The falsification of financial information, insider trading, and
schemes designed to conceal corporate fraud activities and impede the regulating
bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission from conducting their
inquiries”

•

Embezzlement: “The unlawful misappropriation or misapplication by an offender to
his/her own use or purpose of money, property, or some other thing of value entrusted
to his/her care, custody, or control”

• Credit Card/Automated Teller Machine Fraud: “The unlawful use of a credit (or
debit) card or automated teller machine for fraudulent purposes”
•

Extortion/Blackmail: “To unlawfully obtain money, property, or any other thing of
value, either tangible or intangible, through the use or threat of force, misuse of
authority, threat of criminal prosecution, threat of destruction of reputation or social
standing, or through other coercive means”

•

Impersonation: “Falsely representing one’s identity or position and acting in the
character or position thus unlawfully assumed, to deceive others and thereby gain a
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profit or advantage, enjoy some right or privilege, or subject another person or entity
to an expense, charge, or liability which would not have otherwise been incurred”
•

Welfare Fraud: “The use of deceitful statements, practices, or devices to unlawfully
obtain welfare benefits”

•

Wire Fraud: “The use of an electric or electronic communications facility to
intentionally transmit a false and/or deceptive message in furtherance of a fraudulent
activity”

CASE STUDIES
AMY DECHANT
Amy DeChant (white, age 49) was charged with murder in the first degree in December
of 1998. She had killed her boyfriend Bruce Weinstein (white, age 46) for the large sum of
money that was in his possession. In 1995, DeChant was the operator of a cleaning business in
Las Vegas, Nevada. Here, she became romantically involved with Weinstein, an illegal
bookmaker. Illegal bookmakers are bookmakers that accept bets based on agreed odds. They
take bets from people and collects or pays out on the book they have created to detail who owes
whom (Foley, 2022). The two met in the fall of 1995 and days after, she sold her condo and
moved in with Weinstein.
DeChant grew up in a small township of New Jersey. The two-time divorcee moved to
Las Vegas in 1992. Those that knew DeChant were aware that she was highly financially
motivated as opposed to romantically in her relationships. As reported by the NY Daily News a
former boyfriend recalled, “She loved money. All she ever used to say is, 'I want to retire. I want
to retire. I want to retire." (NY Daily News, 2010, p. 5). On July 5, 1996, Weinstein had
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disappeared. In the beginning, DeChant claimed that he left for the night and did not return,
however, Weinstein’s mother did not buy into this story. Later, DeChant changed her
recollection of events. She claimed that four mob hitmen had entered the home, killed Weinstein,
and threatened to kill her if she told anyone what they had done. After a private investigator was
hired by Weinstein’s family, DeChant’s new story began to unravel. The day after her second
testimony, DeChant fled. Investigators uncovered that she had found Weinstein’s cash stash
along with his sports book’s chips and jewelry. (DeCHANT v. The STATE of Nevada, 2000).
On August 11, Weinstein's body was found with a bullet wound from a .38 caliber gun.
This event resulted in a fugitive order being issued on DeChant. About a month following, she
was pulled over for speeding in Maryland. She was arrested, but because she had not been
charged with murder, her bail was only set at $5,000. She paid this immediately with Weinstein’s
money and fled again. DeChant avoided detection for over a year, but she was eventually found
in a nudist colony in Florida (Thevenot, 2001).
The prosecution for this case presented their findings attempting to prove that DeChant
had killed Weinstein because he threatened to end the relationship, and she did not want to give
up the lavish lifestyle she desperately craved. She was convicted for first-degree murder in
October 1998 and sentenced to life in prison without parole. However, this conviction was
overturned in 2000. Rather than going through a second lengthy trial, DeChant took a plea of
second-degree murder (NY Daily News, 2010).
DeChant had an unfortunate upbringing, as she lost both of her parents by the age of nine.
She was predominately raised by her aunt in New Jersey. DeChant’s first marriage was at 17, to
her high school sweetheart. DeChant’s marriage did not last very long. She developed a history
of dating men who had money, the next one was always wealthier than the last (Thevenot, 2001).
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She does not meet the definition of a red-collar criminal. Her case did include fraudulent crimes,
specifically, she was associated with Weinstein's embezzlement schemes. However, most of
these actions were done by Weinstein, and she was only connected. An investigation into
DeChant uncovered these fraudulent schemes. Like street-level criminal motives, she is hungry
for money. She went to Weinstein for his wealth. When Weinstein caught onto what her motives
were, DeChant killed him to steal anything of financial worth Weinstein left behind. She
continued to cover her tracks by using the money she had taken from him to avoid prosecution.
Even though DeChant's case does not qualify as a red-collar crime, it is used to compare
to the others that do. Using the characteristic patterns in Perri's RCM, DeChant's datum
displayed most of the same characteristics, such as a lack of criminal history, no known mental
disorders, and had a murder plan. During the first analysis of this case, it was uncovered that she
was connected to an underlying white-collar embezzlement scheme through her boyfriend
Weinstein (DeCHANT v. The STATE of Nevada, 2000). This fact pushed her case through to the
second round of analysis. During this phase, the matrix was used to point out behavioral patterns
in the investigation and trial phase. It was discovered that DeChant used a .38 caliber to fatally
shoot Weinstein in the chest (Thevenot, 2001). The shooting had taken place at Weinstein's
home in Las Vegas (DeCHANT v. The STATE of Nevada, 2000).
Weinstein’s body was found in the desert near Mesquite, Nevada. When Weinstein's
body was found, a search for DeChant began along with an investigation into her past. During
this investigation, investigators discovered that she was aware of Weinstein's embezzlement
scheme and profited from it (DeCHANT v. The STATE of Nevada, 2000). Unlike Weinstein,
DeChant had no criminal record. She was seen as having a hunger for money (NY Daily News,
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2010). She ran a successful carpet cleaning business, a blue-collar business (Thevenot, 2001).
There was no evidence discovered to suggest she had any debt problems.
During her trial, the jury found her guilty, and she was charged with murder in the first
degree. DeChant had incriminated herself through false testimony when she claimed that the
murder had been committed by the mob. The State provided expert witness testimony from
former Las Vegas Metropolitan Detective Alfred Leavitt stating, "Based on that experience and
that included some 30 years as a police officer and hundreds of such investigations, he examined
the statement given by Ms. DeChant to the police and pointed out several particulars in which
her version of what happened was not credible as involving a mob hit" (DeCHANT v. The
STATE of Nevada, 2000, p. 3). DeChant used this story of a mob hit in an attempt to conceal any
evidence leading the murder back to her. However, blood, gunpowder, and DNA evidence
proved that she was at the scene of the crime and pulled the trigger. She had planned this murder
and attempted to come up with a compelling cover story (DeCHANT v. The STATE of Nevada,
2000). In 2000, the original conviction was overturned, and she took a plea deal admitting to
second-degree murder.
Based on this evidence, DeChant fits several of the same characteristics of a red-collar
criminal. What sets her apart from red-collar criminals is that she did not run a fraudulent
scheme before or at the same time as the killing. Her case provides a great example of the
similarities in behaviors and motives between street-level homicides and fraud-detection
homicides. Similar to Perri’s findings, DeChant displayed narcissistic behaviors. For example,
she displayed behaviors of over self-importance and a lack of empathy for others. Narcissistic
people have an exaggerated conception of their abilities and potential. This was shown when she
assumed that she could hide from the authorities and prosecution.
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EDWARD WAYNE EDWARDS
Edward Wayne Edwards (white, age 44) was a known serial killer from the late 1900’s.
He was known for five murders in Wisconsin and Ohio, two in 1977, two in 1980, and one in
1996. He was born in Akron, Ohio in 1933. Edwards grew up in an orphanage, where he was
both physically and mentally abused by the nuns that ran it (Cameron, 2014). At a young age, he
made his way into juvenile detention for his many enraged outbursts. He was allowed to leave
detention on the condition that he enlisted in the U.S. Marines (Andreadis, 2010). Soon after his
enlistment, he went AWOL and was dishonorably discharged. Succeeding his discharge, he
found himself traveling from state to state working odd jobs to support himself. Eventually, in
1955, he was sent to jail in Akron, where he escaped and continued to drift around the states
robbing gas stations. In 1961, Edwards made the FBI’s Most Wanted List (Cameron, 2014). He
wrote in his autobiography, that he never wanted to commit these crimes under a disguise
because he wanted to be famous (Edwards, 1972). Edwards was captured in 1962, and he was
imprisoned in Leavenworth. However, he was paroled in 1967, ten years before the killings
started (Sangiacomo, 2011).
His homicidal spree began in 1977. However, the murder focused on for this study is the
one of his foster son’s, Dannie Boy Edwards. Dannie (white, age 25) was killed in Burton, Ohio.
Dannie was a member of the U.S. Army and Edwards convinced him to go AWOL. When he
did, Edwards took him into the woods in Burton and shot him two times in the head (Andreadis,
2010). Investigators proved that he had planned the killing of his son for the $250,000 insurance
policy. Edwards had no apologies for the killing of his son and merely wanted to continue his
criminal behavior and avoid prison (Cameron, 2014).
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Edwards confessed to the murder of five victims. But is has been argued that he may be
responsible for up to 15 plus homicides. In 2009, he was finally charged with first degree murder
for the death of Dannie. In 2011, he was sentenced to death in Louisville, Kentucky. Edwards
died on April 7, 2011, of natural causes, avoiding his ultimate execution in Columbus Ohio
(Sangiacomo, 2011).
Edwards' case was used for this study because after primary analysis it was concluded
that he had taken part in an insurance fraud scheme. However, after further review it was
discovered that Edwards actually met the definition of a serial killer. A serial killer is an
individual who repeatedly commits murder, typically with a distinct pattern in the selection of
victims, location, and method (Sutton, & Keatley, 2021). However, like the DeChant case, this
can be used to show a comparison between red-collar criminals and street-level criminals. Using
the characteristic patterns in Perri's RCM, Edwards' datum displayed the same characteristics as
Perri's original cases. During the primary analysis of his case, he was connected to an insurance
fraud scheme at the same time as the homicide of his foster son Dannie Edwards (Andreadis,
2010). Edwards displayed psychopathic tendencies shown in his homicidal spree through the late
70's. These tendencies were also displayed during his juvenile years when he grew up in a foster
home, and was sentenced to juvenile detention (Cameron, 2014).
Edwards took out a $250,000 insurance policy for his 25-year-old white adopted son,
Dannie Edwards. Afterwards, he took Danny into the woods in Burton, Ohio, and shot him twice
in the head (Andredis, 2010). Dannie's body was found in the woods by a hunter. It was only
later discovered by investigators that Edwards' motive was to collect the insurance money
(Edwards, 1972). Unlike Edwards, Dannie had no criminal record. There is no evidence in the
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data that Dannie or Edwards had any debt problems. However, most of the data was collected
from Edwards' autobiography.
His autobiography provided evidence that supported many of the pattern characteristics
in Perri’s RCM. For example, it provides his age at the time if the homicide (44), his race
(white), and listed a series of odd jobs that he had throughout his life. He also mentioned his
previous criminal record which included robbery, assault, and homicide. Edwards made it very
clear that he did not want to wear a disguise because he wanted people to know it was him
committing the crime (Edwards, 1972). This response is evidence that he displayed narcissistic
tendencies with his high sense of self-esteem, and belief in superiority over others. This evidence
can also support the claim of his psychopathic characteristics as well.
In 2009, Edwards was convicted of first-degree murder for the homicide of Dannie
Edwards. In this trial, he also admitted to killing several others (Sangiacomo, 2011).
Investigators discovered blood and DNA evidence that linked Edwards to the crime. During his
trial, Edwards also admitted that he was motivated to kill Dannie to collect the money and get
away with murder (Andreadis, 2010). Similar to Perri’s findings, Edwards displayed
psychopathic traits. These traits included attitudes of manipulation, deception, and exploitation,
and their means always justify the ends, regardless of the crime. His case is important to this
study because it allows a comparison of street-level offenses (serial homicide) and red-collar
offenses (white-collar).

GARY W. PLOOF
Gary W. Ploof, (white, age 37) served as a staff sergeant in the U.S. Air Force in 2001.
He and his wife Heidi Ploof (white, age 29) were stationed at the Dover Air Force Base in
Delaware. Even though he was married, he was having an affair with a colleague of his. After the
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affair started, the Air Force released news of a $100,000 life insurance benefit plan. Ploof found
himself to be automatically enrolled in this plan because he took no action to disenroll. Around
this time, Ploof was also making plans to move in with the woman he was having an affair with.
This event is when Ploof began to plan the homicide of his wife Heidi (Ploof v. State, 2008).
His plan was to kill Heidi as soon as the life policy took effect. He drove Heidi to a
Walmart parking lot and shot her in the head with a .357 magnum revolver. He had attempted to
make the murder look like a suicide with the placement of the gunshot. Ploof also developed a
plan to mislead the police by calling Heidi and gathering friends to help search for her as though
she were missing. Video footage shows Ploof quickly leaving the vehicle where Heidi was
found. He tried to hide the murder weapon on his property and asked friends to hold on to any
other pistols that he owned. Lastly, Ploof lied about knowing about the life insurance policy,
having a mistress, and the weapons he owned (Ploof v. State, 2008).
Ploof had shot his wife in the head in a Wal-Mart parking. Security videotape of the WalMart parking lot on the day that Heidi's body was found showed Ploof hurriedly walking away
from her vehicle (Bailey, 2013). Blood and DNA evidence confirmed it was Heidi. Heidi worked
at a grocery store and had no known debt problems. Neither Heidi nor Ploof had any previous
criminal records. Marital problems existed between Ploof and Heidi, which contributed to
Ploof’s extramarital affairs (Ploof v. State, 2008).
Ploof meets the definition of a red-collar criminal because he killed his wife to cover the
insurance fraud that he was committing (Ploof v. State, 2008). He committed homicide at the
same time as committing fraud. "Ploof revealed his cold-blooded nature after murdering Heidi,
by immediately carrying out an elaborate scheme to mislead the police and hide the
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incriminating evidence, all while making inquiries concerning the life insurance. Although Ploof
expressed his remorse to the jury after the penalty hearing, he also feigned sadness while
attempting to mislead the police and his friends to believe that Heidi had committed suicide,"
Chief Justice Myron Steele said, writing for the court's majority (Ploof v. State, 2008, p.4).
The jury unanimously found Ploof guilty of first-degree murder. Evidence is shown
beyond a reasonable doubt that he killed his wife for pecuniary gain. An 11 to 1 vote found the
murder to be premeditated and a result of planning. (Ploof v. State, 2008). Ploof made several
incriminating statements when he told stories of his missing wife and then got caught in several
lies. For example, Ploof lied to the police about his ownership of several firearms, including the
murder weapon, and about his affair with another woman. He also falsely claimed that he was
not involved in the murder of his wife (Bailey, 2013). After Ploof admitted to the murder in his
testimony, he briefly spoke of the remorse he felt. However, this remorse was discounted by the
judge because he had faked remorse and distress to avoid detection after killing Heidi in the first
place (Ploof v. State, 2008). This idea suggests that he shares manipulative characteristics with
narcissistic and psychopathic traits. These represent similarities in Perri’s original case findings.
This case meets the description of red-collar crime because fraud was committed at the same
time the premeditated murder.
LINDA LOU CHARBONNEAU
Linda Lou Charbonneau (white, age 53) was convicted of killing her two husbands and
was sent to death row. Charbonneau was married to John Charbonneau (white, age 62) with
whom she had her third child. Her first husband and father of her first two children died in an
unfortunate car accident. Once she moved in with her second husband John, the two raised the
three children together. In 1997, Charbonneau grew tired of her relationship with John and left
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him to marry his own nephew, Billy Sproates (white, age 45). After a few years with Sproates,
she returned to continue her relationship with John. She was still married to Sproates when she
returned to her second husband. Soon after her return to John, he was reported missing, and a
few weeks later, so was Sproates. The Delaware State Police began to investigate the two
disappearances. During the investigation, the police discovered Sproates body behind
Charbonneau and John’s home. For months, suspicion was settled on Charbonneau for the
disappearance of John as well. Eight months after Sproates body was discovered, Charbonneau,
her daughter Melissa, and her daughter’s boyfriend Willie Brown were arrested for the murder of
Sproates. After his arrest, Brown led investigators to John’s body as well (Murray, 2004).
The State of Delaware indicted the trio for the criminal offenses that arose out of John’s
and Sproates’ cases. Charbonneau had convinced her daughter and her daughter’s boyfriend to
kill the two men on her behalf. The two were merely part of her plan to secure the men’s
possessions and their money. The prosecution provided evidence in support of the plan to kill the
two men to collect their social security checks. The killing of Sproates was simply their way of
covering up John’s murder when Linda suspected that he was catching on to their murderous
dealings. Enough evidence was presented to the jury to land Charbonneau on death row. Linda
Lou Charbonneau was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. Owing to a
technicality, Linda's case was overturned. She was retried and re-sentenced to 20 years for only
John Charbonneau's murder (Charbonneau v. State of Delaware, 2004).
Charbonneau meets the definition of a red-collar crime because she was caught in a
Social Security and insurance fraud scam. She killed her husband Billy Sproates at the same time
as her fraudulent scheme against him and had her husband John Charbonneau killed after
defrauding him. Charbonneau had planned to collect her husband John for his social security
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after having her daughter's boyfriend, Brown, bludgeon him in the head at their home and then
bury him to death in the woods outside Millsboro, Delaware (Charbonneau v. State of Delaware,
2004).
Investigators found John's blood on moving boxes, a shoe, and pieces of furniture found
in Charbonneau's possession (Murray, 2004). Charbonneau had created cover stories for herself
and her co-conspirators. Investigators visited her home in Bridgeville, Delaware to question her
about John's disappearance. She incriminated herself early on by claiming she had nothing to do
with him missing, she told them she was serving on jury duty on the date of his disappearance.
However, it was later discovered that there was no scheduled court for the 28th of September
when he was reported missing. This event is around the time she began to enter John's accounts
and withdraw any money he had in his accounts (Charbonneau v. State of Delaware, 2004).
Charbonneau moved out of the house she shared with John and moved in with Sproates
(Murray, 2004). Amongst her belongings were the bloody boxes that the investigators later
discovered in the testimony of witnesses. Sproates immediately questioned the bloody sight.
Linda followed his questioning with a threat "to be quiet or he would get the same thing as his
uncle" (Charbonneau v. State of Delaware, 2004, p. 7). This fact was a clear sign of her lack of
remorse and empathy towards the murder of her former husband John. This behavior coincides
with that of someone with narcissistic or psychopathic tendencies. Sproates showed these bloody
boxes to a friend, and former Maryland State Police officer, Roger Layton. Layton's experience
confirmed that the high-velocity blood spatter was consistent with that of a serious crime
(Charbonneau v. State of Delaware, 2004, p. 7).
Witnessing this blood evidence, Layton reached out to Detective Keith Marvel of the
Delaware State Police. Marvel was reassured that John was well enough, and the investigation
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did not proceed. This event led to Charbonneau's arrangement of Sproates' death (Murray, 2004).
Like John before him, Charbonneau had a plan for Brown to kill Sproates. He was brutally
attacked with a knife and bludgeoning. Blood evidence revealed the horrific encounter. Sproates
autopsy uncovered that the violent attack is not what killed him, instead, he was buried alive
(Charbonneau v. State of Delaware, 2004). This is proof of overkill, if Sproates’ are left on the
ground he would eventually have succumbed to his injuries, but Brown accelerated the process
by depriving him of oxygen. Charbonneau meets all definitions of red-collar crime. She
committed fraudulent schemes prior to and at the same time as her homicides. She also meets
several behavioral characteristics as a narcissist and psychopath (lack of empathy, nor remorse,
manipulation, and deception). These traits were discovered across the cases in Perri’s original
red collar work. These similarities attest to the validity of the criminal profile.

LOUISE VERMILYEA
Louise Vermilyea (white, age 25) was a known American “Black Widow.” Her life and
murderous activities spanned through the 20th century. When she decided to murder outside of
her immediate family members suspicions arose. She killed a police officer named Arthur
Bissonette, the authorities were alerted and investigations into the deaths of her two husbands,
two known associates, and several family members began to ensue (The New York Times,
1911).
The murders began in 1893, near Barrington, Illinois. Here, Vermilyea took the life of her
first husband, Fred Brinkamp. His death was originally ruled as a heart attack. However, prior to
his death, Vermilyea made sure to have her named as his beneficiary to his $5,000 insurance
policy. Succeeding Brinkamp’s death, two of the six children, he had met similar fates (Cochran,
1912). Her stepdaughter 26-year-old Lilian Brinkamp grew suspicious of Vermilyea and soon
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met a similar fate to her father’s. Because of the unusual number of deaths in this family, others
thought them to be cursed (The New York Times, 1911).
Soon after the death of her stepdaughter, Vermilyea remarried a man named Charles
Vermilyea. Three years after this marriage began Charles also died due to a sudden illness. From
this death, she collected $1,000 and a house in Crystal Lake, Illinois. In 1910, her stepson Frank
Brinkamp, from her first marriage died under the same circumstances as his father. On his
deathbed, he told others of his suspicion of his stepmother. As a result, Vermilyea received
$1,200 from his death. Her final kill was that of officer Bissonette, who died of arsenic
poisoning. Upon the discovery of the poisoning, Vermilyea was taken into custody by the
Chicago Police Department. It was then discovered that Bissonette’s father had named
Vermilyea as the beneficiary of his life insurance (The New York Times, 1911).
While Vermilyea ultimately was arraigned for the deaths of the lot, she was released on
$5,000 bail. This response was because there was a significant concern for her continued failing
health and exposure to the summer heat in a non-air-conditioned jail, pending her trial for the
poisonings. In April of 1915, a conference was held to determine the continuation of the trial. It
was decided that it would be impossible to obtain a conviction. It was assumed the trial would
cost too much without having the assurance of winning over a jury, for the prosecution ran into
the issue of finding jury members (only men were allowed then) that were willing to send a
woman to death row. It was decided that all charges would be dropped per the request of
Vermilyea’s attorney. It was estimated that she gained a total of around $15,000 from the nine
deaths (Chicago Tribune, 1912).
Vermilyea meets the definition of a red-collar criminal because she was caught on
multiple occasions for her insurance fraud scam. Specifically, she killed two of her stepchildren
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for their suspicions of her involvement in her husband’s death. She used the same plan over and
over until ultimately, she was caught. She escaped prosecution due to her health and age by the
time authorities caught on to her plans. The red-collar definition is met because her murders
happened after or at the same time as her fraudulent schemes. Investigators merely caught onto
her criminal activity too late (The New York Times, 1911).
Her victims are as follows; Fred Brinkamp (white, age 24) killed for insurance fraud,
Cora Brinkamp (white, age 8), and Florence Brinkamp (white, age 4) killed so that she would not
get any money left by her father or be witnesses to the crime, Lillian Brinkamp (white, age 26)
killed for accusing Vermilyea of the murder of her father, Charles Vermilyea (white, age 59)
killed for insurance fraud, Harry Vermilyea (white, age n/a) killed for insurance fraud, Frank
Brinkamp (white, age 23) killed for insurance fraud, Arthur Bissonette (white, age 26) killed for
his suspicion of Vermilyea's homicidal spree. All of Vermilyea's murders were motivated by
financial gain in insurance fraud, or the desire to avoid detection and prosecution for such
homicidal acts (The New York Times, 1911).
Vermilyea incriminated herself by lying in an interview with Chicago Police Captain
Harding. When accused of her murders and asked how she felt about said accusations she
replied,
"They may go as far as they like, for I have nothing to fear. I have simply been
unfortunate in having people dying around me. My first husband was a farmer, and he
drank himself to death, though I feel ashamed to admit it. It was this way: He became
very careless and wouldn't look after things, and we moved into town and started a store.
Matters grew worse, and I decided the farm was best after all. Well, we moved back, and
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apples were plentiful, and we made a lot of cider, and it was the hard cider that killed
him" (Lake County Independent and Waukegan Weekly Sun, 1911, p. 1).
This direct response supplies evidence of her narcissistic and psychopathic traits.
Vermilyea demonstrates a lack of empathy by referring to his death as unfortunate. She
continues by blaming her husband for his own death and insinuates he deserved it because he
"became very careless and wouldn't look after things." She also shows a lack of remorse for the
killings by pinning the blame on her victims (Lake County, Independent and Waukegan Weekly
Sun, 1911).
After the discovery of arsenic poisoning in her final victim, investigators linked the same
poisoning to her earlier victims as well. Vermilyea committed several red-collar crimes. She was
consistently committing insurance fraud, swindling, and acting under false pretenses. These are
all different forms of fraud as defined by the FBI (FBI, 2012). Owing to her lack of conviction,
she may be seen as a successful red-collar offender, meaning that she avoided detection and
prosecution. Similar to Perri’s original findings, Vermilyea did not display any known mental
disorders and held heavy narcissistic and psychopathic traits.

REV. JOHN DAVID TERRY
Reverend John David Terry (white, age 32) shot and killed church handyman James
Matheney (white, 32) on June 15, 1987. Before the death of Matheney, Terry had been
misappropriating church funds since early 1984. For example, he withdrew $10,000 to keep in
cash and another $5,000 to buy a motorcycle. Matheney soon became a part of a plan to assume
a new identity and stage his own death. Terry had discovered Matheney snooping around in the
church into things that may have exposed him. Matheney also met similar physical
characteristics to Terry, assisting in the plan to fake his death. Terry shot Matheney in the back
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of the head with a .38 caliber pistol. Later, he cut the head and right arm off the victim, as well as
cut out any identifying tattoos from the skin to flush them down the toilet. This idea is how Terry
planned to stage the death with Matheney’s body (John David Terry v. State of Tennessee,
2001).
Terry removed the clothing from the rest of Matheney’s body and dressed it with his
own. Terry took the victim’s clothing, and the weapons used to dump them in a dumpster. After,
he purchased two five-gallon containers of gasoline and put them with the body in the church.
He used the motorcycle that he purchased to drive to a lake and dispose of the head and arm of
the victim. Terry then returned to the church, and he set it on fire to burn all evidence left behind.
Terry went on the run, paying for two nights at a motel in nearby Memphis. On June 18, 1987,
police apprehended Terry (John David Terry v. State of Tennessee, 2001).
Upon Terry’s arrest, a detective submitted to the record that Terry demonstrated a total
lack of emotion and remorse when he was being taken in. The arresting officer explained, “I
guess I was looking for some remorse or some signs. After being involved in a three-day
manhunt, like we had, I expected an awful lot more than what I saw. But I saw nothing but just
plain straight up–just no sign of emotion at all” (John David Terry v. State of Tennessee, 2001, p.
3).
Terry was tried for murder in the first degree and was convicted in 1988. He was
sentenced to die in the electric chair. This sentence was overturned on the account of an appeal
for improper instructions being given to the jury. However, once retried with another jury, they
too determined the sentence of death. In 2003, before his trial Terry hanged himself in the
bathroom of Riverbend Maximum Security Institution in Nashville (John David Terry v. State of
Tennessee, 2001). Though it may seem out of character for the reverend, because he had no

39

previous criminal record, Terry meets the definition of a red-collar criminal because he was
caught embezzling from the church that he had power over. He carried out his fraudulent scheme
before killing Matheney. He killed Matheney because he may have discovered the fraudulent
activity and Matheney’s body was also used in trying to avoid detection and prosecution. Terry
knew he was at the risk of being caught so he constructed a plan that would help him get away
with his actions (The New York Times, 1988).
Terry displayed similar characteristics to a narcissist and psychopath by manipulating
Matheney to fit the mold of his plan. He met Matheney and took the time to cultivate a
relationship as a result. After setting him up and killing him, Terry, dismembered the body and
threw it into a dumpster. This event supports the evidence of overkill (John David Terry v. State
of Tennessee, 2001). Investigators also discovered blood and DNA evidence at the crime scene at
the church. These characteristics are similar to the findings in Perri’s original study.

RESULTS
After a review of the cases, the data gathered supports Perri’s definition of red-collar crime. The
exploration of these cases determined that these killers did not merely have a lapse in judgment. In all the
cases determined to be red-collar, fraud had to occur before or at the same time as the homicide. 6 of the
100 cases sampled from the Murderpedia population were determined to contain white-collar crime
characteristics. However, only 4 of the 100 cases met the definition of a red-collar crime. In these 4 cases
(Ploof, Charbonneau, Vermilyea, and Terry), the killers committed homicide to avoid detection and
prosecution of their fraudulent activities.
Amy DeChant killed her boyfriend that was involved in fraudulent activity. Once Weinstein
caught onto her, she killed him to take anything he had left. This also aided in her evasion from the law

(DeCHANT v. The STATE of Nevada, 2000). She does not meet the definitions of red-collar due to
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her lack of committing fraud. Edward Wayne Edwards killed his foster son to collect his life insurance to
aid in his lifestyle of crime and continue to run from legal authorities (Edwards, 1972). He is described
as a serial killer and did not meet the definitions of a red-collar criminal. Though these two offenders are
not considered red-collar, they provided case examples to compare against.
Gary W. Ploof committed insurance fraud. He struck a plan to kill his wife to collect the money
to continue a new life with his mistress (Ploof v. State, 2008). Linda Lou Charbonneau wanted to
collect social security from both husbands and committed a swindle in the means of insurance fraud. She
felt as though she deserved everything they owned and had them both killed to cover up the need for the
funds from their social security (Charbonneau v. State of Delaware, 2004). Louise Vermilyea killed
two of her stepchildren because they became suspicious of the death of their father. They knew Vermilyea
had killed their father to collect insurance money and they in turn, were killed for their knowledge. All of
her other victims were killed to cover up her previous crimes or to swindle them out of their money (The

New York Times, 1911). Rev. John David Terry attempted to fake his own death to avoid detection of
his embezzlement from the church he ran. He killed the handyman of the church to cover up his crimes
and avoid detection (John David Terry v. State of Tennessee, 2001).
Common risk factors were displayed among this new case study, including but not limited to,
entitlement, lack of empathy, power orientation, rationalizations, exploitations, and a general disregard
for rules and norms (Walters, 1995). All six cases discussed in this study presents some if not all the risk
factors listed. Amy DeChant felt entitled to Weinstein’s fortune. She had a complete disregard for rules
and norms when she killed him to take power of his funds (DeCHANT v. The STATE of Nevada,

2000). Edward Wayne Edwards had a complete disregard for human life and a total lack of empathy. He
wanted to become famous from his crimes. Edwards felt entitled to the money his foster son’s life
insurance had to offer. His criminal record also suggests he had a general disregard for rules and norms

(Edwards, 1972). Gary W. Ploof lacked empathy for his wife when he began his affair with his mistress
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and exploited the fact that he would gain a lump sum of money by killing his wife and collecting her life
insurance money. He rationalized his decision by convincing himself he was going to begin anew with his
mistress and his wife was going to leave him, though there is no evidence to support the latter claim

(Ploof v. State, 2008). Linda Lou Charbonneau presented a lack of empathy when she deployed a plan
to have both of her husbands killed to collect their social security. She felt entitled to all their possessions
and rationalized their deaths to obtain them (Charbonneau v. State of Delaware, 2004). Louise
Vermilyea presented a clear lack of empathy when she went on to kill a known total of nine individuals.
She felt entitled to the money that would come from their deaths and she exercised her power over them
by poisoning them (The New York Times, 1911). Rev. John David Terry used the power that he had
with his status in the church to embezzle $30,000. He lacked empathy when he killed the handyman who
may have known of his fraudulent dealings. He exploited his kill by then using the body to stage his own
death to avoid detection (John David Terry v. State of Tennessee, 2001).
The Perri Red-Collar Matrix was also used to assess all case studies. The matrix was used to point
out the relationship between known criminal pattern characteristics and the cases being tested. All cases
showed underlying white-collar criminal behavior. None of the above cases displayed any known mental
disorders. All perpetrators in this study are white, provided incriminating statements, tried to conceal
evidence, and had a plan for their murders. Reactive violence was used in all cases as opposed to
instrumental. They all displayed violence in reaction to getting caught.

CASE STUDIES RED-COLLAR MATRIX

Pattern
Characteristics
Underlying
White-Collar
Crime
Idolatry

Amy
DeChant

Edward
Wayne
Edwards

Gary W.
Ploof

Unknown

Insurance
Fraud

Insurance
Fraud

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Linda Lou
Charbonneau
Social
Security/Insurance
Fraud
Unknown

Louise
Vermilyea

Rev. John David Terry

Insurance
Fraud

Embezzlement/Insurance
Fraud

Unknown

Unknown
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Mental
Disorder
Weapon Used
Source of
Violence

Gun

Psychopathic
Traits
Gun

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendants

Defendant

Defendant

Victim’s
Home

Public/Victim’s
Home

Public

Victim’s Home

Public/Victim’s
home

Public Church

Victim

3rd Party

3rd Party

3rd Party

3rd Party

3rd Party

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Victim (Gender)

Male

Male

Female

Male

Victim (Age)

46

25

29

62 and 45

Victim (Injury)
Victim
(Race/Ethnicity)
Victim’s Body
Found

Body

Head

Head

White

White

Yes

Place of Murder
Fraud
Detection by
Victim/3rd Party
Did Victim
Participate in
White-Collar
Crime?

Victim’s
Occupation
Victim’s
Occupational
Status
Victims Related
to Each Other
Victim Related
to Defendant?
Victim Debt
Problems
Does Victim
have a Prior
Criminal
Record?
Defendant
(Gender)
Defendant
(Age)
Defendant
(Race/Ethnicity)
Defendant’s
Occupation

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Gun

Buried Alive

Poison

Gun

Body and Head

Males and
Female
60, 59, 8, 4, 31,
23, 26, N/A, 26
Body

Head

White

White

White

White

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Illegal
Book
Making
(bookie)

Unknown

Grocer

Rodeo

Unknown

Church Handyman

WhiteCollar

Unknown

Bluecollar

Blue-Collar

Unknown

Blue-Collar

NA

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Male
32

No

Adoptive Son

Wife

Husbands

Husbands,
Children,
Grandchildren,
No

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Female

Male

Male

Female

Female

Male
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44

37

53

25

32

White

White

White

White

White

White

Carpet
Cleaner

Odd-jobs

U.S. Air
Force

Unknown

Insurance
Fraud

Reverend
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Defendant’s
Occupational
Status
Defendants
Related to Each
Other?
Defendants
Debt Problems?
Defendant Prior
Criminal
Record
Defendant
Relationship to
Victim
Found Guilty
by Jury?
Offense
(Murder)
Defendant
Admits to
Murder?
Overkill?
Incriminating
Statements?
Concealment of
Evidence?
Blood Spatter
Evidence?
Computer
Evidence?
DNA Evidence?
Murder Plan?
Shoe Print
Evidence?

BlueCollar

Blue-Collar

BlueCollar

Unknown

White-Collar

Blue-Collar

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Unknown

Yes

No

Girlfriend

None

Spouse

Wife

Wife, Mother,
Grandmother,
None

None

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

2nd
Degree

1st Degree

1st Degree

2nd Degree

Charges
Dropped

1st Degree

Plea deal

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Unknown

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

TABLE OVERVIEW
Underlying White-Collar Crime

Idolatry
Mental Disorder
Weapon Used
Source of Violence
Place of Murder
Fraud Detection by Victim/3rd Party

Unknown-12.5%; Insurance Fraud-62.5%;
Embezzlement-12.5% Social Security Fraud12.5%
Unknown-100%
Unknown-83.3%; Psychopathy-16.7%
Gun-66.7%; Asphyxiation-16.7%; Poison16.7%
Defendant-100%
Public-50%; Victim’s Home-50%
Victim-16.7%; 3rd Party-83.3%
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Did Victim Participate in White-Collar
Crime?
Victim (Gender)
Victim (Age)

Victim (Injury)
Victim (Race/Ethnicity)
Victim’s Body Found
Victim’s Occupation
Victim’s Occupational Status
Victims Related to Each Other
Victim Related to Defendant?
Victim Debt Problems
Does Victim have a Prior Criminal Record?
Defendant (Gender)
Defendant (Age)
Defendant (Race/Ethnicity)
Defendant’s Occupation
Defendant’s Occupational Status
Defendants Related to Each Other?
Defendants Debt Problems?
Defendant Prior Criminal Record
Defendant Relationship to Victim
Found Guilty by Jury?
Offense (Murder)
Defendant Admits to Murder?
Overkill?
Incriminating Statements?
Concealment of Evidence?
Blood Spatter Evidence?
Computer Evidence?
DNA Evidence?
Murder Plan?
Shoe Print Evidence?

Yes-16.7%; No-83.3%
Male-71.4%; Female-28.6%
N/A-6.6%; (0-10)-13.3%; (11-20)-0%; (2130)-33.3%; (31-40)-13.3%; (41-50)-13.3%;
(51-60)-13.3%; (61-70)-6.6%
Body-42.8%; Head-57.1%
White-100%
Found-100%
Unknown-33.3%; Bookie-16.6%; Grocer16.6%; Rodeo Employee-16.6%; Church
Handyman-16.6%
Unknown-33.3%; White-collar-16.6%; Bluecollar-50%
N/A-16.6%; Yes-33.3%; No-50%
No-30%; Yes-70%
Unknown-83.3%; No-16.7%
No-83.3%; Yes-16.7%
Male-50%; Female-50%
(0-10)-0%; (11-20)-0%; (21-30)-16.7%; (3140)-33.3%; (41-50)-33.3%; (51-60)-16.7%
White-100%
Unknown-16.7%; Carpet Cleaner-16.7%;
Odd-Jobs-16.7%; U.S. Air Force-16.7%;
Insurance Fraud-16.7%; Reverand-16.7%
Unknown-16.7%; Blue-collar-66.7%; Whitecollar-16.7%
Yes-16.7%; No-83.3%
Unknown-50%; No-33.3%; Yes-16.7%
Unknown-16.7%; No-50%; Yes-33.3%
None-33.3%; Partner-11.1%; Spouse-33.3%;
Mother-11.1%; Grandmother-11.1%
No-16.7%; Yes-83.3%
Charges dropped-16.7%; 1st Degree-50%; 2nd
Degree-33.3%
Plea deal-16.7%; Yes-83.3%
Unknown-16.7%; No-33.3%; Yes-50%
Yes-100%
Yes-100%
No-50%; Yes-50%
No-100%
Yes-100%
Yes-100%
No-100%
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This thesis provides the knowledge to answer the following questions: Is this definition
of red-collar crime practical and generalizable when applied to a new set of cases? Does this
study confirm Perri's suggestion that red-collar criminals behave similarly to street criminals?
What are these similarities?
Red-collar crime is a newly defined subgroup of white-collar crime. A red-collar
criminal uses violence to avoid detection or prosecution for their crimes. This type of crime
determined by the action of fraud happening before or at the same time as the violence. Redcollar crime can be further understood and explained by defining white-collar crime and
debunking misconceptions that may exist surrounding this type of crime.
White-collar crimes are committed by financial elites who abuse the trust and power that
have been given to them in their careers (Benson and Simpson 2015; Dearden 2017; Piquero
2012). What the phenomenon of white-collar crime is and how to measure it is still widely
discussed by scholars. White-collar crime reflects high levels of corporate misconduct and
occupational fraud schemes among middle-class citizens (Weisburd et al., 1991). This combined
with predatory offenses (Bucy et al., 2008) are keys to the perception of the white-collar
offender. Current research has shown that past research has been shortsighted on important
developments such as motivations (Simpson, 2019). Society perceives illegal behavior to be out
of character for white-collar criminals because we view them as employed, educated, and lawabiding citizens. This misconception may help to explain our lack of knowledge for this type of
criminal.
Past studies of the white-collar criminal failed to include individual personality traits as
potential fraud offender risk factors (Perri, Lichtenwald, &; Mieczkowska, 2014). Some of these
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risk factors may be uncovered by understanding the criminal thinking of white-collar criminals.
White-collar criminal histories and levels of deviance are no different from non-white-collar
criminals (Walters, & Geyer, 2004). Not many white-collar studies have been conducted to
discuss behavioral consistencies following their careers over a long period of time (van Onna, et
al., 2020). A lack of understanding of this type of criminal thinking may help the criminal
community. It may block specific searches for criminal activity that can be used to define redcollar trends (Perri, 2015). The reasons and motivations behind the white-collar crime are an
enduring criminological conundrum (Jordanoska, 2018). Understanding the social psychology of
one's fraudulent behavior is grounded on, but not limited to how an individual reacts to the
instability of preferences, (Maulidi, 2020). Like street criminals, white-collar criminals are
motivated by need, greed, fear of failure, revenge, excitement, and economic survival
(Jordanoska, 2018). Knowing the different motives behind this type of crime will deepen our
understanding of this type of criminal. The lack of regard for white-collar criminal thinking
supports the assumption that these offenders may use this vulnerability to expose and target
victims. These crimes may be perpetrated by the same people believed to not have the capacity
to resort to violence and criminal actions. Behavioral risk patterns and attitudes must be studied
so that we may further our understanding of white-collar criminals.
Historically, it was believed that white-collar criminals’ illegal actions are abnormal.
However, research described that there has yet to be an observable case where the person is
acting out of character. Behavior such as deviant thought processes may predate their offenses
and have existed for a long time. These thought processes may have been kept at bay in wait of
an opportunity to present itself. The fact that the offender has chosen to engage in certain acts
does not mean that it is outside of one’s character. Criminal thinking was a stressed role in the
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support, maintenance, and reinforcement of adult criminal behavior (Walters, 1990). Commonly
displayed criminal traits often include but are not limited to, entitlement, lack of empathy, power
orientation, rationalizations, exploitations, and a general disregard for rules and norms (Walters,
1995). Not only limited to one group, but criminal thinking and anti-social traits also apply to
both white and red-collar offenders (Walters, 2002; Walters & Geyer, 2004; Perri &
Lichtenwald, 2007).
Studies have shown that recidivism rates are comparable between white-collar and nonwhite-collar crime (Weissmann & Block, 2007), both types of offenders possess thinking and
criminal deviancy traits that are virtually identical to one another, especially among chronic reoffenders (Walters & Geyer, 2004). White-collar criminals become more comparable to streetlevel criminals when there is an observable pattern of fraudulent activities. This new comparison
puts them into the category of being viewed as predators or pathological criminals. (Dorminey et
al., 2010). The understanding of this comparison helps to unveil potential red-collar behavioral
risks.
In Perri's original red-collar research, he pointed out two key behavioral risk
characteristics. He pointed to psychopathic and narcissistic traits, which he claimed were key to
the rise of white-collar crime turning red (Alalheto, & Azarian, 2018). Psychopaths possess the
ability to lie without feeling uncomfortable, and they can manipulate people with high-quality
interpersonal skills. This quality allows them to easily persuade their victims (Boddy, 2006;
Hare, 1993; Ray, 2007). Narcissism is a personality disorder that involves a strong sense of selfconfidence; it is exaggerated by the overt feeling of excessive admiration, self-importance, and a
lack of empathy for others (Alalheto, & Azarian, 2018). White-collar criminals may possess
these qualities and knowing this provides clarity to the red-collar criminal profile.

48

This thesis compares instrumental and reactive violence to better understand red-collar
criminals. When the offense is goal-oriented first, the homicide will be rated under the use of
instrumental violence. There may be no evidence of direct situational or emotional provocation
(Hart & Dempster, 1997). For a homicide to be rated as reactive violence, there must be
irrefutable evidence that the crime was committed at a high level of spontaneity and lacked
planning or premeditation (Perri, 2015). In most red-collar cases, the offender knows the victim,
reflective of reactive violence. However, this action is inherently very instrumental (Perri, 2015).
Distinctions between genders in white-collar crime are also discussed to further the
understanding of red-collar criminals. A study comparing men and women in criminal thinking
suggested a general similarity between the two genders. This suggests that, despite gender
norms, there is little difference in the cognitive process between male and female offenders that
are charged with white-collar offenses, however, women remain less involved in criminal
activity, and this includes white-collar offenses (Belknap, 2001). This issue suggests that
criminal thinking in red-collar cases may present the same risk factors across genders (Perri &
Lichtenwald, 2010).
Analogous to Perri's original red-collar criminal study, his red-collar matrix was also used in the
study of the cases for this thesis. The Perri-RCM was used to distinguish behavioral factors from evidence
gathered (Perri & Lichtenwald). Every case where the defendant had been involved in fraud is listed
under the last name which appears at the top of the matrix. Matrices like this analytical tool are used in
the social sciences to explore relationships between individuals and populations. Relationships are not
this simple, but matrices allow one focus on specific characteristics. (Bradley & Meek, 2014). The use of
the Perri-RCM in this case maps out the relationship between behavioral pattern characteristics and the
people that are being assessed.

49

A sample of homicides derived from Murderpedia provided 100 cases for analysis. Key
terms (fraud, embezzlement, insurance fraud, corporate fraud, Ponzi schemes, racketeering, and
bankruptcy) were searched to determine if they qualified as white-collar crimes. Only 6% of the
cases examined in this study were white-collar crimes. After further analysis, only 4% of the
cases met the definitions of a red-collar crime meaning that only a small number of homicidal
offenders were involved. The knowledge found from this study is important because it sheds new
light on the current red- collar criminal research. Perri claims that this group of criminals is not
anomalous, but my findings suggest that they only represent a very small minority of offenders.
Perri's definition of red-collar crime is by far the best description I have come across, and I
wanted to explore the concept further.
The use of Murderpedia as a source for offenders limited this study because it is a
crowdsourced encyclopedia. Crowdsourced data has limited this study in many ways. For
example, I collected all true facts from public records, court cases, police records, and news
releases outside of the encyclopedia. Crowdsourcing doesn’t leave much room for
confidentiality. Like almost everything on the internet, crowdsourced datum is accessible to just
about everyone. This type of data also poses the risk of obtaining plagiarized information. It is
extremely important to have checked all entries with factual outside sources, like in this thesis
with the use of previously listed sources.
Generalizability also sets forth a limitation to this study. In the social sciences invoking
generalizability is more problematic as it is often based on assessment of a mainstream
population but may not apply to groups outside of the mainstream. This is a significant challenge
to developing appropriate policy and interventions suitable for other groups. This is not only an
important consideration for practitioners in search of successful interventions, but also academics
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trying to understand and contribute to knowledge in a variety of fields, including the diffusion
and adoption of innovation (Linton, 2020).
This study discovered that the new case studies meet Perri’s original red-collar definitions. The
criminal behavioral patterns of red-collar criminals can be compared to street-level criminal behaviors
and show similarities. These behaviors may include psychopathic and narcissistic traits, which are key to
the rise of white-collar crime turning red. Finally, this type of criminal is more of an anomaly than Perri
claims.

To further explore this field, I suggest that a more white-collar offense concentrated
population be used. This study was limited using an online crowdsourced encyclopedia. It may
better serve the field to use a more reliable sampling frame. This idea might include a larger
variety of homicides and white-collar crimes in general. It is needed to achieve more accurate
results in the criminal profiling of this type of offender.
Qualitative research such as this is very important in research. It addresses the "how" and
the "why" research questions that may exist. It enables a deeper understanding of experiences,
and in this case a phenomenon. It allows one to ask questions that cannot easily be put into
numbers about the human experience (Cleland, 2017). This study explored the generalizability
and practicality of Perri's definition of red-collar crime as applied to a new set of cases. It also
affirms the similarity of red-collar offender behavior to street-level criminals suggested by Perri.
In exploring this phenomenon, I have also debunked misconceptions that surround white-collar
crime. This understanding of red-collar crime can provide a new level of awareness in the study
of criminal behavior. Knowing the characteristics of this violent offender may assist in the
prevention of white-collar crime turning red.
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